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SOME CONFIRMED CHAPTER 11 PLANS
FAIL. SO WHAT?
STEPHEN I-I. CASE*
Abstract: Critics of the feasibility requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (11) contend that the current bankruptcy system inadequately
prevents repeat Chapter 11, or "Chapter 22," filings. Undoubtedly, there
are instances of confirmed Chapter 11 plans that turn out to be unfeasi-
ble despite court findings to the contrary. Given the uncertainties of
investment projections and capital markets, however, the occasional fail-
ure of Chapter 11 plans is not necessarily a greater evil than alternatives
such as liquidation or excessively conservative capital structures. Chapter
11 is, by its very definition, a hit-or-miss venture; thus, it misses occasion-
ally. Some confirmed Chapter 11 plans fail. So what?
INTRODUCTION
Section 1129(a) (11) of the Bankruptcy Codel makes it a condition
precedent to confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan for the
court to find that Iclonfirmation of the plan is not likely to be fol-
lowed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganiza-
tion, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, un-
less such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." 2 The
unscholarly folklore suggests that the requirement was created because
Congress did not want business debtors to emerge from bankruptcy
unless their Chapter 11 plans were soundly contrived, so as to free
them from future failure resulting from the vicissitudes of the business
* Managing Director and General Counsel, Cohen & Company, LLC; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; formerly Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell;
A.B., LL.B., Columbia University. Mr. Case is a member of the American Law Institute and
the Bankruptcy Judges Education Committee of the Federal judicial Center, and an emeri-
tus member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the U.S. Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101 et seq. (2000). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L, No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
(2000)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is typically referred to as the "Bankruptcy
Code" or the "Code." References in this work to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are
to Title 11 of the U.S. Code. References to "Chapter 11" are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1179
(2000).
2 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11).
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cycle. In other words, Congress intended to prevent debtors from
emerging out of Chapter 11 only to file a second Chapter 11 case soon
thereafter—a sequence sometimes colloquially referred to as a "Chap-
ter 22" case.
This Article examines the feasibility requirement of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (11) and considers whether it meaningfully and helpfully
predicts future business failures. Part I of this Article outlines the cur-
rent judicial interpretation of the feasibility requirement. Part II then
considers whether courts should develop more specific criteria for
feasibility determinations. Part HI discusses the present dearth of in-
formation needed to determine the effectiveness of the feasibility re-
quirement and its implementation. Part IV proceeds to examine the
"real world" operation of the feasibility requirement. Part V presents
competing views with respect to whether the court system sufficiently
prevents repeat Chapter 11 filings. Finally, Part VI discusses—without
conceding that a problem necessarily exists—whether the system can
be improved and considers factors that likely contribute to overly op-
timistic expectations for Chapter 11 plans. The Article concludes by
arguing that although some Chapter 11 plans inevitably fail under the
current regime, this is no greater evil than other—perhaps even less
desirable—alternatives.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FEASIBILITY REQUIREMENT
Conventional approaches to legal scholarship call for analyzing
reported judicial rulings in order to illuminate the meaning of a stat-
ute. Thus, in order to understand the feasibility requirement set forth
in section 1129(a) (10, 3 one must turn to the courts. A frequently
cited legal standard for feasibility is whether the factual showing at the
plan confirmation hearing establishes a "reasonable assurance of suc-
cess," though "[s]uccess need not be guaranteed." In the context of
section 1129(a) (11), relatively few reported cases articulate much
more than this basic standard, except to state that Chapter 11 issues
are fact-intensive and that trial court decisions will be upheld unless
"clearly erroneous."5
3 See id.
' Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Wolf, 61
B.R. 1010, 1011 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)).
5 See, e.g., In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P'ship, 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1993)) (explaining that "the
[bankruptcy] court need not require a guarantee of success," and instead may require
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The "clearly erroneous" rule is important in the context of appel-
late review of feasibility determinations. The feasibility of Chapter 11
plans is decided exclusively at the trial court level based on the factual
record before the court. Thus, if a busy trial court takes the time to
write an opinion that is based heavily on the weight that the court
gives to various witnesses and other evidence in the record, it is
difficult for a reviewing court to find a lawful basis upon which to re-
verse the trial court. In other words, due to the "clearly erroneous"
standard, reversal on appeal of a reasonably well-drafted trial court
opinion or order containing carefully detailed factual findings regard-
ing feasibility is virtually impossible. For instance, according to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "Rio be clearly errone-
ous, a decision must strike [the court] as more than just maybe or
probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently stated
during oral argument, strike [the court] as wrong with the force of a five-
week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish."G
II. SHOULD COURTS DEVELOP MORE SPECIFIC FEASIBILITY CRITERIA?
Aside from the frequently cited standard for feasibility referenced
in the Second Circuit's Kane v. Johns-Manville Corporation—whether
there is a "reasonable assurance of success," though "[s] access need
not be guaranteed"—no other clearly articulated appellate standards
"[o]nly a reasonable assurance of commercial viability"); see also In re Danny Thomas
Props. II Ltd. P'ship, 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a provision in the
post-confirmation obligation documentation requiring automatic liquidation in the event
of default does not render feasible an otherwise unfeasible plan); In re 203 N. LaSalle St.
P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the bankruptcy court's findings on
close questions of fact as to feasibility were not clearly erroneous), trit'd on other grounds sub
nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999);
Quality Inns Intern., Inc. v. L.B.H. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 911 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1990) (un-
published table decision) ("In light of the extensive confirmation hearing and the bank-
ruptcy court's opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the
court does not find its determination of feasibility to be clearly erroneous."), available at
Nos. 89-2443 to 89-2445, 1990 WL 116761, at *4; Berkeley Fed. Bank & Trust v. Sea Garden
Motel & Apts. (In is Sea Garden Motel & Apts.), 195 B.R. 294, 305 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996)
(quoting In re Eddington Thread Mfg. Co., Inc., 181 B.R. 826, 832-33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995)) ("[T] he feasibility inquiry is peculiarly fact intensive."); S & P, Inc. v. Pfeifer, 189
B.R. 173, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that a debtor failed to prove a sufficient
future cash flow and upholding the bankruptcy court's finding that reorganization was
impossible), affd, 78 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished).
6
 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added).
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for what constitutes a feasible plan currently exist.? As noted above,
the issue of feasibility is decided almost exclusively at the trial court
level based on the court's characterization of the factual record de-
veloped at the confirmation , hearing. A trial court determination that
a Chapter 11 plan is feasible is a determination that both the future
performance of the reorganized business and future conditions in the
relevant subsector of the economy are going to have favorable charac-
teristics. This is economic crystal-ball gazing. With respect to this type
of forecasting, no one is ever right all of the time.
Where does this leave the courts? It is difficult to speculate as to
what a court of appeals might say if compelled to adopt a feasibility
standard more specific than that articulated in Kane.8 Would a court
require fixed criteria based on balance-sheet ratios; for instance,
would there have to be a minimum fixed-charge coverage ratio?
Would businesses have to demonstrate enough of an equity-weighted
capitalization in order to obtain an investment-grade credit rating?
These are conventional concepts to those familiar with financial
covenants hi corporate loan agreements and debt indentures.
The trouble is, however, that these concepts do not work. Gen-
erations of bankers and attorneys, who perpetually devise and revise
formulae like these as financial covenants in loan agreements, have
not yet come up with a way for contractual language to prevent future
default in the real world. Furthermore, excessively conservative capi-
tal structures intended to provide multiple "cushions" against future
default can sometimes hobble enterprises to the point where they in-
hibit success. In sum, forward-looking contractual language is often
no substitute for good, human business judgment applied at the rele-
vant time.
III. ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY REQUIREMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS
AMID A LACK OF DATA
No centralized federal system currently exists to collect and pub-
lish detailed information with respect to how the Chapter 11 system
actually works. 9 Thus, many questions abound. Which industries have
higher filing rates than others? How long do cases typically last? How
7 See 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Monnier (In re
Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Wolf, 61 B.R. 1010, 1011 (Bank -.
N.D. Iowa 1986)).
See 843 F.2d at 649 (citing Prudential Ins. Co., 755 F.2d at 1341; Wolf 61 B.R. at 1011).
9 NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS at 919
(1997).
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many cases result in the confirmation of plans? How many jobs are
saved or lost as a result of Chapter 11? The lack of data is frustrating
to researchers trying to answer these questions.
Recent legislation, however, should address this problem." A new
federal statute requires the Attorney General of the United States (who
will presumably act through the Office of U.S. Trustee) to promulgate
regulations that will require Chapter 11 debtors to file periodic re-
ports. 11 These reports will include, in addition to any other matters
proposed at the discretion of the Attorney General, the following:
(1) information about the industry classification, published
by the Department of Commerce, for the businesses con-
ducted by the debtor;
(2) length of time the case has been pending;
(3) number of full-time employees as of the date of the or-
der for relief and at the end of each reporting period since
the case was filed;
(4) cash receipts, cash disbursements and profitability of the
debtor for the most recent period and cumulatively since the
date of the order for relief;
(5) compliance with title 11, whether or not tax returns and
tax payments since the date of the order for relief have been
timely filed and made;
(6) all professional fees approved by the court in the case for
the most recent period and cumulatively since the date of
the order for relief (separately reported, for the professional
fees incurred by or on behalf of the debtor, between those
that would have been incurred absent a bankruptcy case and
those not); and
(7) plans of reorganization filed and confirmed and, with re-
spect thereto, by class, the recoveries of the holders, ex-
pressed in aggregate dollar values and, in the case of claims,
as a percentage of total claims of the class allowed."
The statute also requires that the reports
10
 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 602(a), 119 Stat. 23, 120-22 [hereinafter BAPCPA] (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 589b).
111 1d. § 602(a), 119 Stat. at 120 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 589b (a) (2)).
12 Id. § 602(a), 119 Stat, at 121-22 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 589b(e)).
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shall be designed (and the requirements as to place and man-
ner of filing shall be established) so as to facilitate compilation
of data and maximum possible access of the public, both by
physical inspection at one or more central filing locations, and
by electronic access through the Internet or other appropriate
media."
Nothing in the statutorily mandated contents of the reports requires
disclosure of prior Chapter 11 filings by the same or related debtors."
Perhaps, however, commentators will persuade the Attorney General's
office to use its discretion to add to the yet-to-be-promulgated regula-
tions a requirement for the disclosure of such information."
Notwithstanding any answers this new legislation may eventually
yield—both in terms of the statutorily mandated information and any
additional information that the Attorney General may require—the
fact remains that little data is currently available with respect to
whether too many Chapter 11 cases result in the confirmation of un-
feasible plans. This raises a compelling question: Is the statutory re-
quirement for feasibility in fact a meaningless phrase frequently hon-
ored only in breach?
W. FEASIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN THE "REAL WORLD"
Based on the author's experience, the scope of feasibility evi-
dence presented to a court in a Chapter 11 plan confirmation hearing
is principally a function of whether the plan's confirmation is con-
tested. Thus, a dichotomy exists in the empirical reality of plan
confirmation hearings. On the one hand, if a plan is contested, then
the section 1129(a) (11) feasibility issue is likely to be a lightning rod
for litigation during the confirmation hearing. Thus, the trial judge in
such a case must simply consider the competing evidence and make a
decision. The more factually grounded the trial court's decision, the
less likely it is to be reversed on appeal.
On the other hand, uncontested confirmation hearings unfold
quite differently and, in the author's opinion, present the highest
danger of excessively optimistic forecasts that could look foolish in
hindsight if the debtor files again. For example, if a plan is supported
by the "leading players" in most of the significant creditor groups with
13 Id. § 602(a),119 Stat, at 120 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 589b(b)).
" See id. § 602(a), 119 Stat. at 121-22 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 589b(e)).
15 See BAPCPA § 602(a), 119 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 589b(d)).
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no or only token opposition, then the proponent of the plan—often
the debtor—files sets of spreadsheets with the court along with sup-
porting affidavits. These filings represent to the court that the pro-
jected cash flows of the debtor will be sufficient to cover its liabilities.
The filings opine further that, barring unexpectedly severe downturns
in the business cycle, the plan confirmation is not likely to be followed
by liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization.
With no contrary evidence in the record, and no cross-exam-
ination of any feasibility witnesses—whose testimony may even have
been filed by affidavit—the court typically will accept this evidence as
conclusive proof that the plan is feasible. Thus, in such a situation, a
plan could be confirmed without any significant focus on the evidence
presented in support of feasibility. It is the author's opinion, without
the benefit of an empirical study, that most repeat Chapter 11 cases, at
least in the large-case environment, can probably be traced back to
uncontested plan confirmation hearings featuring consensual Chapter
11 plans similar to that described above.
V. COMPETING VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM
Recently, some commentators have criticized the effectiveness of
the feasibility requirement, publishing detailed studies that purport to
establish that some jurisdictions have higher rates of repeat-filing
Chapter 11 debtors than others and that consider possible explana-
tions for this phenomenon.I 8
 For instance, one recent study con-
cluded that:
Delaware-reorganized firms were significantly more likely to
refile, significantly more likely to go out of business ... and
significantly less likely to perform successfully .... These
findings warrant the conclusion that Delaware-reorganized
firms [for the period studied] failed more often than firms
emerging from reorganization [elsewhere]."
A recent example of the repeat filing phenomenon is US Airways,
which has filed for Chapter 11 protection twice in recent years. 18 This is
113 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations Failing!, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1945 (2002).
17 Id.
18 See Elwin Green, US Airways Out, Prrrs nu RGII POST-GAZETTE, Sept, 18, 2005, at E2.
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but one of several examples available in the large company context)0
The repeat-filing phenomenon is particularly acute within the airline
industry. For instance, Trans World Airlines has filed three times, and
Continental Airlines and Midway Airlines have each filed twice. 2° Situa-
tions such as these lead commentators to conclude that the present sys-
tem needs more backbone—that is, more independent judicial scrutiny
of feasibility evidence is necessary to prevent repeat filings."
Certain cases, however, contradict such criticism of the system.
Some Chapter 11 reorganizations have been spectacularly successful. 22
For instance, the stock of Kmart Holding Corporation performed
amazingly well soon after its emergence from Chapter 11 in early
2003.23 In a period of approximately two years thereafter, a $10,000
investment in Kmart Holding Corporation stock would have grown in
value to more than $53,000. 24
Bankruptcies such as that of Kmart Holding Corporation repre-
sent a clearly correct finding of feasibility at the confirmation hearing
and thus lead to a line of thinking alternative to the views of skeptical
commentators who criticize the feasibility requirement's effectiveness
in preventing future Chapter 11 filings. This line of thinking says, in
effect: So what? Chapter 11 is difficult. The purpose of the process is to
save jobs and protect going-concern value. If it doesn't work in some
situations, then try again. Keep fixing the business until it works.
The debate as to whether reforms are needed has yet to be re-
solved. The Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of
the Bankruptcy System and the Federal Judicial Center recently held
a conference in which judges and attorneys with expertise in large
Chapter 11 cases briefly addressed some of the criticisms referenced
above. 23 The participants also briefly debated whether courts should
be required to appoint special feasibility experts. 26 No consensus,
19 See Blakeley & Blakeley LLP, The Serial Chapter II Debtor: From Chapter 22 to 33 to
(Even) 44, TRADE VENDOR MON'IlILY News FLASH, Feb. 2002, http://www.bandblaw.com/
tvnutf/February2002/February-2002.htm.
" Mark Korda & Mark Men tha, Chapter 11 Doesn't Fit Australian Story, Aus -rt.. FIN. Rev.,
June 3, 2003, available at http://www.kordamentha.com/national/display.aspx?ID=39.
21 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 16, at 1984.
22 See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 286 B.R. 345 (Bankr. N.D. III. 2002).
2S See Kmart Holding Stock Report (KMRT), Charts & Returns, http://quicktake.
morn
 ingstancom/ Stock/Stockperformance.asp?Cou n try= USA&Symbol = KMRT.
24 Id.
" JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE HANKA. SYS. & FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., CONFERENCE ON LARGE CHAPTER I I CASES 1, 36 (2009), available at http://www.
fjc.goy/public/ pdfinsf/lookup/LargCh 1 1 .pdf/$File/LargChll.pcif.
" Id. at 36.
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however, was reached with respect to either issue. 27
 Additionally, a
1997 federal review of the state of national bankruptcy policy re-
ported no significant problems with respect to the drafting or admini-
stration of section 1129 (a) (11), although it did not address the feasi-
bility issue directly. 28
VI. IS THERE A SOLUTION (ASSUMING THERE Is EVEN A PROBLEM)?
Undoubtedly, some Chapter 11 plans approved as feasible in
confirmation hearings turn out not to be feasible. Observers differ as
to whether they believe such outcomes result primarily from in-
sufficient vigilance in the confirmation process. 29
 Blaming bankruptcy
judges and creditor constituencies for post-confirmation business
failure, however, is not appropriate. No one possesses the proverbial
crystal ball. Thus, the only conceivable "fix" of the process may be to
conduct a public policy assessment as to whether additional safe-
guards are necessary in uncontested Chapter 11 confirmation hear-
ings.
In the author's experience, uncontested Chapter 11 plan
confirmation hearings have often been the result of successful consen-
sus-gathering efforts. These efforts frequently result in hearings where
the court has no reason to question plan-proponent representations
with respect to feasibility. This can result in court acceptance of expec-
tations as to future revenue levels, interest rates, and business activity
that might not have been able to withstand an attack from well-
prepared creditors opposing the plan. Other times, however, honest,
carefully calculated sets of projections in which plan proponents have
high levels of confidence are presented at uncontested hearings. Inevi-
tably, even when plan proponents hold a good-faith belief—as most
proponents likely do—that the emerged business will generate enough
cash to meet the demands imposed by the post-plan capital structure,
some projections turn out to be wrong. Plan proponent fatigue and
recovery dumping by distress investors are also factors likely contribut-
ing to any problem with the feasibility requirement—assuming, of
course, that there is one. Both phenomena, in efforts to reach a con-
sensus, can contribute to excessive optimism in plan formulation.
Plan-proponent fatigue occurs when the process of managing a
business in Chapter 11 becomes so onerous that pressure to end the
27 1d.
28 See generally NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 9.
29 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 16, at 1984.
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case can distort judgment with respect to how well a business will per-
form when freed from the expenses and distractions of the Chapter
11 proceeding. This sometimes produces an "offer them anything;
just get this nightmare over with" attitude among plan proponents.
This can result in excessively optimistic projections and, eventually, in
Chapter 22. In addition to plan-proponent fatigue, recovery dumping
by distress investors can also contribute to excessive optimism with
respect to plan feasibility. Distress investors sometimes acquire claims
against debtors at attractively low prices and plan to dispose of any
recoveries in the markets as soon as possible after plan confirmation.
.This strategy encourages such investors to vote in favor of question-
able plans. Desiring no long-term stake in the business, they simply
expect to realize a gain and immediately transfer the risk of a second
bankruptcy to marketplace purchasers. From the perspective of dis-
tress investors, the more aggressive the plan expectations, the greater
their potential reward.
In the hypothetical scenarios described above, and in other situa-
tions, each participant in the plan negotiation process has an incen-
tive to err on the side of optimism. If all constituents support the
scheme, then it is in the interest of no participant to derail the plan
by submitting evidence at the hearing that might cast doubt on its fea-
sibility. Perhaps the only limiting principle currently in place to guard
against situations like these is fear of post-plan prosecution for perjury
or fraud.
CONCLUSION
All of this produces a conundrum for the courts. Should courts
intervene during plan confirmation hearings and ask detailed ques-
tions regarding evidence offered to establish feasibility? Should courts
do so even if no one at the hearing is contesting the plan? Do courts
risk a loss of public confidence if they fail to do so?
Even if a court were to require additional evidence of feasibility at a
plan confirmation hearing, such a requirement would likely result only
in the presentation of substantially similar evidence that the reorganized
debtor could or could not reasonably he expected to "make it." How is
the court to decide? Who can predict stock markets, commodity prices,
or business cycles? Fortunes are made and lost by sophisticated investors
with their own money at risk, with extensive and expensive advisory re-
sources, and with considerable time to weigh various investment strate-
gies. That fortunes are sometimes lost indicates that forecasters some-
times make major mistakes. How can a busy bankruptcy judge with little
2005)	 The Chapter 11 Feasibility Requirement	 69
time to conduct a complex confirmation hearing be expected to be as
good as—let alone better than—investment seers who, incidentally, are
sometimes right and sometimes wrong?
Undoubtedly, there are instances of confirmed Chapter 11 plans
that turn out to be unfeasible despite court findings to the contrary.
Yet given the uncertainties of investment projections, the vicissitudes
of markets, and other imponderables, is the fact that some Chapter 11
plans end up failing a greater evil than the various alternatives—such
as excessively conservative capital structures or liquidation with its
rapid, attendant loss of numerous jobs? Opinions differ on this issue.
Nevertheless, one fact remains: Chapter 11 is almost by its very
definition a hit-or-miss venture. Consequently, it misses occasionally.
Some confirmed Chapter 11 plans fail. So what?
